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NOTES
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT*
SECTION 20 of the Federal Criminal Code provides that "whoever, under
color of any law . . . willfully subjects . . . any inhabitant of any State
. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States" shall be liable
to a fine of $1000 and imprisonment up to a year.' That Section, originally a
part of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866,2 and since slightly revised,3 was
held constitutional and given a working definition by the Supreme Court in
Screws v. United States,4 seventy-nine years after its enactment into law.
In the Screws case, three Georgia law enforcement officials-a sheriff,
policeman and special deputy-were indicted under Sections 19 1 and 20 of
the Criminal Code and under Section 37,1 the general conspiracy statute, for
conspiring to violate Section 20. The officers had arrested a negro, trans-
ported him to the local courthouse and there had beaten him to death. At
the trial there was evidence that the sheriff "held a grudge" against the
victim and that the alleged warrant upon which the arrest was made was
either non-existent or improperly issued after the negro died. The prosecu-
tion proceeded upon the theory that the defendants' acts had deprived the
negro of his life without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Conviction by a jury of Georgia citizens and a sentence of
$1000 and three years imprisonment for each defendant was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals.
7
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.8 A plurality of
four, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, reversed the conviction and
voted to remand, because of error in the trial court's charge to the jury.'
* Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
1. 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S. C. § 52 (1940).
2. 14 STAT. 27 (1866).
3. It was amended by § 17 of the Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, 16 STAT. 144
(1870); revised, pursuant to Act of June 20, 1874, 18 STAT. 113 (1874), to prohibit the
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States" rather than certain enumerated privileges and immuni-
ties, R~v. STAT. § 5510 (1875); and the word "willfully" was added in the enactment of the
Criminal Code of 1909, 35 STAT. 1092 (1909).
4. 325 U. S. 91 (1945). See Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro Rights
(1946) 46 COL. L. REv. 94.
5. 35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 51 (1940). The trial court sustained a demurrer
to this count.
6. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S. C. § 88 (1940).
7. Screws v. United States, 140 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
8. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
9. Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in this disposition of the case so that the
issues presented might be decided by a majority of the court, although his
opinion argued that the conviction should have been affirmed.10 Mr. Justice
Murphy, in a dissenting opinion, maintained the conviction should stand. 1
Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, and Jackson also dissented, but their joint
opinion favored setting aside the conviction absolutely.,
The cleavage between the majority and the dissenters occurred on two
issues: (1) whether the acts committed were prohibited by Section 20; and
(2) whether the standard of conduct prescribed by Section 20 was sufficiently
definite or was void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment.
The appellants' argument that the acts committed were not within the
purview of Section 20 was twofold: (1) since the jury refused to believe the
defense of excusable or justifiable homicide, the acts were perforce viola-
tions of Georgia law and hence not "under color of law"; and (2) even if the
acts were to be regarded as "under color of law," the Federal Government
could not take cognizance of them because the victim was deprived of his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed against author-
ized state acts. These two arguments overlapped and, to a degree, were
mutually dependent. In denying the first contention, the majority held
that "under color of law" meant "under pretense of law," or "with ostensible
authority," hence the acts did not have to be in fact lawful. They concluded
as to the second that the Fourteenth Amendment did protect against such
"ultra vires" acts of state officials.
The majority interpretation of "color of law" in Section 20 seems clearly
supported by United States v. Classic,"i the Supreme Court's only other inter-
pretation of the statute. Despite the efforts of the dissenters to distinguish
it, 14 the Court there held that "under color of law" did include acts in viola-
tion of state laws. The unlawful acts were by Louisiana election commis-
sioners who, purporting to perform the duties of their office, falsely counted,
altered and certified the number of ballots cast in a primary election.'5
Aside from this precedent there is no guide as to the meaning of the statute
in other decisions, since the lower courts had only upheld its constitutionality
without specifically interpreting its wordingYG
10. Id. at 113.
11. Id. at 134.
12. Id. at 138, henceforth called the dissenting opinion.
13. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
14. The dissenters xiewed the Classic decision as focussed on the protection of primary
elections under Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution and not as interpreting the phra-a
"color of law." Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 147 (1945).
15. "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only becauz-
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state
law." United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299,326 (1941).
16. United States -. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785, No. 16,151 (C. C. D. Ky. 1866); In re
Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337, No. 14,247 (C. C. D. Md. 1867); United States v. Horton, 26
Fed. Cas. 375, No. 15,392 (D. Ala. 1867) (no opinion); United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730
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Statements of the sponsors of the Act of 1866, men who framed the Four-
teenth Amendment as well, 17 indicated that the phrase was designed to
reach anyone who used apparent authority to accomplish the deprivation of
a federally secured right.18 Of the Congressional quotations relied upon
by the dissent to reach an opposite conclusion, one seems highly ambiguous
and inconclusive, 9 and the other, in its original context, scarcely supports
the inference drawn from it.
20
In their search for the definition of this controversial phrase, the majority
remarked the inconsistency in interpreting "under color of law" as meaning
"lawful" when the legislature could have used the latter word had it meant
to so limit the scope of the statute. Recognition of a distinction between
the two terms is bolstered by the change in meaning effected by the words
"color" and "colorable" 21 when included in legal phrases such as "colorable
(color of) title," 22 "color of office," 23 and "color of law" itself when used in a
different context.24
Thus, the conclusion of the Court that the acts committed by the ap-
pellants were "under color of law" within the meaning of the statute seems
sustainable in the light of all available criteria of definition. Moreover, in
deciding that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to
(C. C. S. D. Ohio 1882); United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836 (D. Md. 1911); United States
v. Stone, 197 Fed. 483 (D. Md. 1912). But cf. United States v. Jackson, 26 Fed. Cas. 563.
No. 15,459 (C. C. D. Cal. 1874).
17. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 328 (1936) (legis-
lation by drafters of Constitution as defining constitutional power).
18. Senator Sherman said: "If the offender, who may be a loafer, the meanest man in
the streets, covers himself under the protection or color of a law or regulation or constitution
of a State, he may be punished for it." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1870) 3663.
19. One instance of congressional discussion, seized on as significant by the dissent, uses
the word "pretense" in apposition to "color." 325 U. S. 91, 143 (1945).
20. Senator Trumbull said: "These words 'under color of law' were inserted as words of
limitation, and not for the purpose of punishing persons who would not have been subject to
punishment if they had been omitted. . . . [remainder of paragraph quoted by dissent,
325 U. S. 91, 143].
"The assumption that State judges and other officials are not to be held responsible for
violations of United States laws, when done under color of State statutes or customs . . .
places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine out of which the rebellion was hatched."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 1758.
21. See Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191 (1926); State v. Gant, 201 N. C. 211,
225, 159 S. E. 427, 434 (1931); Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N. C. 380, 383 (1867). But see
Berks County v. Reading City Pass. Ry., 167 Pa. 102,115,31 Atl. 474,475 (1895).
22. See Schrimpscher v. Stockton, 183 U.S. 290,298 (1902) (that which in appearance is
title, but which in reality is no title); Gooch v. Citizens & So. Nat. Bank, 196 Ga. 322, 326,
26 S. E. (2d) 727, 730 (1943); Warlick v. Rome Loan & Finance Co., 194 Ga. 419, 422, 22
S. E. (2d) 61, 63 (1942).
23. See Smith v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 71 Ga. App. 697,703, 32 S. E. (2d) 105, 109
(1944) (a wrong committed by an officer under pretended authority).
24. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932) (a state officer "while acting
under color of state law" may exceed the authority conferred by the state); McCain v. Des
Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 175 (1899).
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illegal acts of state officials, the majority seems equally justified. In terms a
prohibition on the states, the Fourteenth Amendment has been declared to
imply a guarantee of rights, privileges and immunities against action by
officials who exercise the power of the state rather than by the vague entity
denominated "the state." 25 The rights protected have included procedural
due process,"6 as well as substantive due process, in rate-fixing7 and taxation
cases.2s Protection has been extended even though the acts for which relief
was sought in federal courts were beyond the power of the official or illegal
under state law.Y Moreover, an officer has been held to be acting in his
official capacity even after he has attempted to divest himself of that capac-
ity where the wrong he accomplished was aided by his earlier assertion of
authority.3 Those cases in which the Supreme Court denied relief for acts
allegedly violating Fourteenth Amendment rights seem to be based upon
doctrines of finality of state action or of comity between state and federal
judiciary.3
Besides the determination of the coverage of the statute, the Screws
opinion held Section 20 valid against the constitutional arguments by ap-
pellants that it presented a standard of criminal conduct which was not
sufficiently specific, particularly when applied to the broad guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Declining to confine the Section to acts
"clearly prohibited" by "specific provisions of the Constitution," because
that would eliminate the wide range of rights protected by the due procezs
clause, 32 the Douglas opinion supplied an adequate standard of conduct by
25. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 657, 664 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 226 U. S.
73, 84 (1932); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373 (1886); F% parte XVirginia, 100 U. S.
339, 346-7 (1879); United States v. Ragen, 59 F. Supp. 374, 378 (N. D. Ill. 1945). Cf. Ex
parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) (suit to restrain a state officer acting beyond his power
held not a suit against a state forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment, becauze the state
could not authorize unconstitutional acts; yet the suit is maintainable where the acts violated
the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)..
27. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913); but cf. Barney v. City of
New York, 193 U. S. 430 (1904).
28. Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
29. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941); Iowma-Des Moines Bank v.
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); see Mooney ,. Holohan, 291 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932) (federal court has jurisdiction where acts were ta!:en
under color of law without determining whether the acts were lawful or not); Home Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 287 (1913) (question of legality of the act is irrelevant
if it results in the deprivation of a federally secured right).
30. Catlette v. United States, 132 F. (2d) 902,906 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
31. There is a presumption that the state will correct any violation of due proceZ3,
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 115 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397 (13S0);
and it must be clear that it has not done so after all state remedies have been exhau:tcd,
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238 (1941). See Isseks, Jmrisdiction of l'x Z6-wr Fedcral
Courts to Enjoin Unautlzorizrd Action of State Officials (1927) 40 HAT,. L. REv. 969, 933-3,
for policy applicable to support these doctrines.
32. 325 U. S.91, 105 (1945).
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an interpretation of the word "willfully." As used in the statute, the ma-
jority construed "willfully" to mean that the defendant must have as his
purpose the deprivation of those individual rights which are made specific
by the express terms of the Constitution, by laws of the United States, or by
decisions of the Supreme Court. Despite this careful definition, the Court
implied that sometimes constructive intent might be sufficient, so that a
defendant may be convicted for acts "in reckless disregard of constitutional
prohibitions or guarantees." 11
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion maintained that such a re-
quiement of willful intent does not make more definite acts prohibited in
broad language,34 and that Section 20, even as interpreted by the majority,
presented too vague a standard to satisfy the requirements of due process
contained in the Fifth Amendment.
Cases involving vagueness as a test of constitutionality-a doctrine first
announced by the Court in 1914 ",-afforded support for both points of view
on the legal level. Generality of language in both void and valid statutes was
equal.36 Few of the voided statutes had any requirement of willfulness,?
and the majority opinion's concept of the word had been used in holding
several statutes valid.s
In upholding the validity of the statute, the majority opinion, however,
seemed to follow the only consistent policy criteria that can be drawn from
these cases. Legislation had been declared unconstitutional: (1) to protect
an individual from prosecution for conduct which is not sufficiently defined
to afford advance warning; (2) to permit an adequate opportunity to make
a defense; and (3) to obviate interference with innocent or desirable ac-
tivity.39 Section 20, as interpreted by the majority, seems to fulfill the first
two purposes of warning and opportunity to make a defense. And the third
objective also appears satisfied since its interference with legitimate law
enforcement activity does not seem greater than that of the Sherman Act
33. Id. at 106.
34. Id. at 153.
35. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-4 (1914).
36. Compare the language discussed and upheld in the following cases: Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 573 (1942); United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 52X
(1942); Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 26 (1941); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1,
8-9 (1938); with the language declared too vague in the following cases: Pierce v. United
States, 314 U. S. 306, 310 (1941); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939); Hera-
don v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 261 (1937). See Comment (1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 160 for a
discussion of the doctrine.
37. In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) the statute contained
"willfully," but intent was not argued or considered by the court.
38. See United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524 (1942); Gorin v. United States, 312
U. S. 19, 27 (1941); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1938); Old Dearborn Co. v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 193 (1936); Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373,
378 (1913); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375,396 (1905).
39. See cases cited supra note 36.
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with legitimate business activity,0 or that of the Espionage Acts with the
newspaper and radio industries.4' The Court's recent alertness in protecting
individuals from excesses or infringement of rights committed by law en-
forcement officials may have led both the majority and the dissent to exag-
gerate the potential burden on such officers of the criminal liability posited
by Section 20.42
An additional line of precedent-decisions under Section 19, companion
provision to Section 20-further suggests that Section 20 presents a suffi-
ciently practical standard of conduct. With terms substantially the same as
Section 20,4 3 it has been applied to protect the right to freedom from in-
voluntary servitude guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. 4 It has
even been used against the deprivation of the right of a federal prisoner to
be free from violence, a right which the Court found inherent in the consti-
tutional establishment of the Federal Government, without reference to
any specific constitutional clause.45 The dissenting opinion does not mention
the analogy to Section 19, although reasons for holding Section 20 invalid on
the score of vagueness would apply with equal force to Section 19 4 -which
at this late date would seem clearly immune to such a constitutional at-
tack.47
40. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); see also Argument for
Appellants, Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 37S, 377 (190S).
41. Brief for Appellants, p. 58, Gorinv. United States, 312 U. S. 19 (1941).
42. Malinsld v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tenneszee, 322 U. S. 143
(1944); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); McXabb v. United
States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943); but cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944); Hyzler v.
Florida, 315 U. S. 411 (1942). Interference with local law enforcement by maling officers
over-cautious is the only possible policy ground upon which the dissenting opinion could
be based. Double jeopardy does not prohibit state prosecution after federal conviction if
the same act constitutes offenses against each sovereign. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S.
312 (1926), 48 A. L. R. 1102, 1106 (1927); United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 382 (1922).
43. Section 19 prohibits persons conspiring "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." 35 STA.T. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 51 (1940).
44. Smith v. United States, 157 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), eorl. dern.c, 208 U. S.
618 (1908).
45. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
46. See rights protected in Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); In re Quarles,
158 U. S. 532 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892); United States v. Waddell,
112 U. S. 76 (1884); cf. United States v. Powell, 212 U. S. 564 (1909); Hodges v. United
States, 203 U. S. 1 (1906); United States v. Cruibshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
47. Ex parle Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. 'Mosley, 238 U.S. 383,
386, 387 (1915) ("It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional .... [It]
dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump.");
United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 321 (1941) ("the Court found no uncertainty, or
ambiguity in the statutory language"). Before the Classic case, however, the statute was
little attacked for vagueness. Mr. Justice Rutledge suggests this can only be ewplained by
the practical result of its application, i.e. defendants have not been tahen unavares and the
statute has not interfered with desirable activity. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91,
128 (1945).
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Under the Screws decision, Section 20 assumes importance as a possible
weapon against the invasion of civil liberties by state law enforcement offi-
cials. Recent lower federal court cases have charted the area of its applica-
tion: false arrest, imprisonment and extortion; 48 extraction of a confession
by threats, assault and torture; 49 pursuing and killing a negro without just
cause; 11 restraint of Jehovah's Witnesses, forcing them to drink castor oil,
inciting mob action and failing to protect the victims from that violence. 1
Though the Circuit Court of Appeals in the last-mentioned situation de-
clared that the failure of the police officer to protect the Witnesses from the
mob was within the scope of Section 20,52 it seems questionable whether non-
action alone would support the imposition of criminal liability.6A It may be
assumed, however, that an officer in charge of a prisoner who was abused or
lynched would be liable under Section 20 if he affirmatively aided in the
consummation of the wrong.5 4 Another decision indicates the difficulty of
applying the Section to judicial acts,5  although it seems probable that clear
proof of a deliberate breach of duty resulting in a gross wrong would create
liability.
The Court has limited possible federal interference with local law enforce-
ment under Section 20 in establishing the requirement of "willful" intent.60
Under this requirement, federally-protected rights may not be created or
extended by criminal prosecutions, since unknown or unknowable rights
cannot be "willfully" violated. Thus suits similar to the Classic case,6
7
wherein primary elections were for the first time held to be protected by the
Constitution will be difficult to maintain as criminal actions." To prevent
further abuse of the statute, the Court might resort to its pre-1914 applica-
tion of the vagueness doctrine: Section 20 will not be held invalid but merely
48. Culp v. United States, 131 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
49. United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N. D. Ga. 1940).
50. United States v. Trierweiler, 52 F. Supp. 4 (E. D. I1. 1943).
51. Catlette v. United States, 132 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
52. Id. at 907.
53. Non-action was held to contravene the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 343 (1938), and there is a
dictum to that effect in McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U. S. 151, 162 (1914). Both
cases were civil actions.
54. See note 51 supra. Cf. Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Not to be Lynched" (1943)
28 WAsH. U. L. Q. 57.
55. See United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926 (S. D. Cal. 1944).
56. Apparently a requirement the sponsors of the Act believed to be in it, even before
the word "willfully" was added. Senator Trumbull, defending the 1866 bill, said: "I admit
that a ministerial officer, or a judge, if he acts corruptly or viciously in the execution or under
color of an illegal act, may be and ought to be punished; but if he acted innocently the judge
would not be punished . . . there must be a . . . joint operation of act and intent or
criminal negligence; and a judge who acted innocently, and not viciously or oppressively,
would never be convicted under this act." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 1758.
57. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
58. It is interesting to note the Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a strong dissent in the
Classic case, not on the grounds that primary elections were unprotected by the Constitu.
tion, but that it would endanger civil liberties to impose criminal liability on one who in-




inapplicable to conduct infringing a vaguely protected right. While thus
limited in the scope of its operation, Section 20 could at the same time be
made more effective where the right is well recognized by utilizing the con-
cept of constructive intent, thereby obviating the practical difficulty of
proving actual scienter and willful violationPr3
As a practical matter it would further appear that difficulties of adminis-
tration will be a greater limitation upon the abuse of Section 20 than the
safeguards set up by the Court in this case. First, all prosecutions under the
statute must be brought in the district in which the crime was committed,
so that the judge, prosecutor, grand jury and trial jury will all be residents
of that state.61 Second, the Department of Justice can handle only a small
percentage of the reported violations, indicating that only the grossest viola-
tions of the statute will be prosecuted 2 Third, Congress closely supervises
the Department's expenditures for such prosecutions and can quickly put
an end to the abuse of administrative discretion. 3
The Screws case empowers the United States Attorney to use Section 20 as
an effective weapon against gross invasions of civil liberties by law enforce-
ment officials in areas where state legal processes are influenced by local
prejudices and politics. In some instances, Section 20 may be the only
available means of protection. 4 The major weapons against discrimination,
however, will continue to be education, economic measures, and moral
suasion.65
59. See United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 28S (1891).
60. Upon retrial, the defendants in the principal case were acquitted. Although the
judge's charge is not yet available, it appears to have played an important part in the case.
The judge quoted the opinion of the principal case at length in endeavoring to follow the
requirements laid down therein. Communication to the YALE LAw Jo, LTMAL from lawyer in
the Department of Justice, Feb. 11, 1946.
61. See U. S. CoNs-r. ART. III § 2, Cl. 3; 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28 U.S. C. § 114 (1940);
Proposed F. R. Cpme. P., c. V, Rules 18, 21 (1945).
62. See Hearings before te Subconumittee of the Comnmittee on Appropriatifos, House of
Representatives, on the Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 63-4. See Department of Justice Circular No. 3356 (Supp. 3, Nov. 3, 1943)
(set forth in Brief for United States, App. III, in principal qase) for seif-impozcd limitation,
and see United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 2S7 U. S. 77, 4 (1932), for weight
accorded administrative practice and interpretation.
63. See Hearings before te Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hotse of
.Representatires, on the Deparment qf Justice Appropriation Bill for 1940, 76th Cong., lt
Sess. (1939) (Department representative queried on propriety of taking action under Section
19 against persons also liable to state prosecution).
64. The editor of a noted Georgia paper characterized the area as "one of the mno
backward counties of the South," adding that "its politics are run by a small, cloze-knit,
corrupt group." Indicating local prejudice, the letter stated that "the sheriff .w reelected
to another term while he 'as in jail." In the newspaper editor's opinion, "there will never
be an indictment returned against this man (Screws) in his own county and for the ctate's
attorney to initiate indictment involves a complicated procedure which can be blocked by
the county in question." The editor concluded by saying that his paper had "editorially
exposed, condemned, etc.," but to no avail. Communication to Y,%u. L~y: Jonu,-L, Jan. 3,
1946.
65. See J. IV. JoinsoN, NEGRO AemERICANS, WHMAT NOW (1934) c. 3; Cotn r;cu o:;
THE Economc STATus OF TE NEGRO, REPORT TO THE COnuTTEE ON FLNDInGs (%Waehing-
tcn. D. C.. May 11-13, 1933); CATHOLIC AssocraIloN FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, RErOnT
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REMEDIES OF MERCHANT SEAMEN INJURED
ON GOVERNMENT OWNED VESSELS*
DURING the war the bulk of the American Merchant Marine was owned
by the War Shipping Administration and managed, maintained and equipped
by private steamship companies acting as general agents under a standard
form agreement.' The courts have been in conflict as to whether the gov-
ernment or the general agents were liable for the injuries suffered by seamen
employed on these vessels.'
The traditional remedies of seamen injured in the service of their ships
are based upon the shipping articles, the maritime contract of employment.3
By this contract the employer (usually the owner of the vessel 4) is under
obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel with sound appurtenances I and to
furnish maintenance, cure and wages at least to the end of the voyage.'
Breach of either duty by the employer is actionable in the admiralty as a
*Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 P. (2d) 275 (Ore. 1945).
1. In contrast to the 1,375 vessels which comprised the American merchant fleet at
the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Shipping Administration had under its
control on July 31, 1945, 4,267 large craft vessels (1,000 gross tons or more) which were
being operated for its account under agency agreements. The total deadweight tonnage of
these vessels amount to 45,612,888. A total of 3,900 out of 4,267 ships were operated under
the General Agency form of service agreement, GAA 4/4/42, set forth in 7 FED. REG.
7561 (1942); KNAUTH, UNITED STATES WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION (1942) 249-60.
The balance of 367 vessels were being operated under the Time Charter Agency form of
service agreement. In addition 133 small craft vessels (ocean-going tugs, harbor tugs, and
barges) were being operated under the General Agency Agreement. Communication to
YALE LAW JouiNAL from General Counsel, War Shipping Administration, Oct. 23, 1945.
For material on the operations of the wartime merchant marine, see H. R. REP. No. 107,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Judson, Flag for a Song (unpublished thesis in Princeton Uni-
versity Library, 1942) (pre-war operation of ships under the Panamanian registry).
2. See cases cited infra notes 21, 32. The determination of the relationship between
the War Shipping Administration and/or the General Agents and the vessel's employees
affects the rights of some 180,000 seamen.
3. The coverage provided by "in the service of the ship" is wider than "in the course
of and arising out of his employment" of workmen's compensation statutes. See Comment
(1943) 38 ILL. L. REv. 193; Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 318 U. S. 724 (1943). The
remedies provided are contract, not tort claims. The Montezuma, 19 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A.
2d, 1927); Cresci v. Standard Fisheries Co., 7 F. (2d) 378 (N. D. Cal. 1925).
4. When a vessel is operated under a bareboat charter, the charterer is the employer
of the crew. Under charter parties which do not constitute a demise of the vessel, tile owner
is the employer. See ROBINSON, ADmIRALTY LAW (1939) 593-600 (hereafter cited as RoaN-
SON); discussion nfra note 30.
5. Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), 92 U. oF PA. L. Ruv. 459,
30 VA. L. REv. 486; The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (1903). Every contract of hiring a crew
contains an implied warranty of a safe place to work. Rainey v. New York & P. S. S. Co.,
216 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914), cert. denied 235 U. S. 704 (1914); Burkholder v. U. S..
60 F. Supp. 700 (E. D. Pa. 1945). Fellow servant negligence cannot create an unseaworthy
ship so such negligence provides a defense to this action. See Plamals v. S. S. Pinar Del
Rio, 277 U. S. 151, 155 (1928).
6. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (1903); Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525
(1938). The classic historical treatment of this remedy is by Story, J., in Harden v. Gordon,
11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6047 (C. C. D. Me. 1823). See AXTELL, MERcHANT SEAMEN'S LAW
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libel in rem against the vessel 7 or in personam against the employer,8 and
also at common law in state 9 and federal courts 10 under the "Saving to
Suitors" clause of Section Nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 When the
United States or one of its agencies is the employer, the sole 12 remedy
against the government is by means of a libel in personara as provided by
the Suits in Admiralty Act.13 Irrespective of the claimant's choice of remedy
or forum the maritime law furnishes the substantive rules of decision.1 4
As an alternative to these contract claims,'8 the Jones Act I, in 1920
(1943) 53-71; Notes (1944) 13 FORD. L. REV. 132; 22 Tnx. L. Rlv. 239; (1942) 28 VA. L.
REv. 649.
7. U.S. v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210 (U.S. 1844); The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411
(U. S. 1866); The Resolute, 168 U. S. 437 (1S97).
8. Carlisle Pacing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255 (1922); John A. Roebling's Sons
Co. of New York v. Erickson, 261 Fed. 986 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), cert. denied 252 U. S. 5S5
(1920).
9. Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538, 129 N. E. 265 (1920). See 1 BNEsrxcr, A!Erj-
cAN AnDmALTr (6th ed. 1940) 33-53 (hereafter cited as BENEDIcT).
10. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (191S). Nlien proceeding at law
in the federal courts litigants must meet the jurisdictional requirements of 54 STxr. 143,
28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1940). This means, in effect, diversity or alienage jurisdiction plus
jurisdictional amount in controversy. Erlich v. Wihelmsen, 44 F. Supp. 414 (E. D. N. Y.
1942); Philadelphia R. R. v. Berg, 274 Fed. 534 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921), ctrl. denied 257 U. S.
638 (1921).
11. 1 STAT. 76 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41(3), 371 (1940). See 2 SToRY, COMEINT. VES
ON THM CoNsTrru-ioN (5th ed. 1891) 466, quoted with approval in Taylor v. Carryl, 20
How. 583, 598 (U. S. 1857).
12. Originally, as the rights arose from contract, an injured seaman vas allowed to sue
the United States under the Tucker Act, 24 ST.T. 505 (1887). 28 U. S. C. § 250(1) (1940),
in the Court of Claims where the statute of limitations was six years. Comment (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 1189, 1192. However, since 1930 the Suits in Admiralty Act, lee. cit. itfra
note 13, has been held to furnish the exclusive remedy against the United States. John-
son v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U. S. 320 (1930), apprarcd Brady v.
Roosevelt Shipping Co., 317 U. S. 575 (1943). No libel in rem is permitted against a govern-
ment-owmed vessel. Eastern Transportation Co.v. U. S., 272 U. S. 675 (1927).
13. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 741-52 (1940). The history of this Act is treated
in Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1189, 1192. See 1 BENEDIcr at 436-77.
14. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luchenbach S. S.
Co., 247 U. S. 372 (1918); National Shipbuilding Co. v. Mallia, 243 S. V. 757 (Ten. Ct.
Civ. App. 1922). Before the Jensen case, the state courts were free to apply whatever sub-
stantive rules they desired. See cases collected in Note (1943) 10 U. or Cm. L. R-v. 339,
340, n. 7, 341, n. 13. However, the constitutional requirement of national uniformity of
maritime law ended this practice. Cf. dissent of Pitney, J., 244 U. S. 205, 223, 255. Sae
Palfrey, The Comnwn Law Courts and t1w Law of te Sea (1923) 36 Htuv. L. RE-v. 777, 785-6.
15. The election between the Jones Act remedy, loc. cit. infra note 16, and mainte-
nance, cure and wages is not final. Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S. S. Co., 105 F. (2d) 604
(C. C. A. 5th, 1939). Medical expenses may be recovered in an action for maintenance,
cure and wages if not included in a Jones Act recovery. Muise v. Abbott, 60 F. Supp. 561
(D. Mass. 1945); The W. H. Hoodless, 3S F. Supp. 432 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Ottinger v. Wall-
ing, 335 Pa. 77, 5 A. (2d) 801 (1939); ef. Jones v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 30
(E. D. Pa. 1945). However, an election to sue upon the implied wNrantv of a Eeavorthy
ship may not be made after a Jones Act suit fails. Plamals v. S. S. Pinar Del Rio, 277 T. S.
151 (1928); Burkholderv. U.S., 60F. Supp. 700 (E. D. Pa. 1945). See ROIv sOw at 335-340.
16. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940). For discussions of this Act and its
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created a tort cause of action based upon negligence and incorporated
into maritime law the equivalent rights and liabilities conferred upon rail-
road employees by the Federal Employers Liability Act.17 Remedially,
the seaman was authorized to proceed at common law before a jury or
in the admiralty to enforce these provisions; and his beneficiaries were
empowered to maintain an action in case of his death.' However, the cause
of action thus created has been construed to lie only against the employer
of the injured sailor. 9 Thus, the determination of Jones Act liability under
the standard form agreement depends upon whether the War Shipping Ad-
ministration or the private shipping company as general agent employs the
crew.
In Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines 21 the Supreme Court of Oregon
treated the United States as the sole employer of a seaman on a War Ship-
ping Administration Liberty ship managed and supplied by a private com-
effect upon merchant seamen, see 1 BENEDIcT at 42-53; 4 id. at 194-210; RoBiNsoN at
309-344; AXTELL, MERCHANT SEAmEN'S LAW (1943) 45-52. In general the Jones Act re-
moved the maritime defenses of contributory negligence (which resulted in apportionment
of damages), assumption of risk (which was very limited under maritime law) and fellow
servant negligence (which acted as a complete bar to recovery as at common law). These
defenses are discussed by Willock, Commentary on Maritime Workers (1941), 46A U.S.C,A.
211, 261-8.
17. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et sea. (1940). By reference the provisions of
this Act are included in the Jones Act as they are amended. Panama R. R. v. Johnson,
264 U. S. 375 (1924); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110 (1936).
18. The action may be brought in the federal courts, Sabine Towing Co. v. Brennan,
85 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), or state courts, Panama R. R. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557
(1926), or in personam in the admiralty, Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924),
but hot in rem, Plamals v. S. S. Pinar del Rio, 277 U. S. 151 (1928); Samuels v. Munson
S. S. Line, 63 F. (2d) 861 .(C. C. A. 5th, 1933). Venue is limited by the Act in law actions to
districts in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
An admiralty writ of foreign attachment upon the vessel to obtain venue where the vessel
is found is not an in rem proceeding and may also be used. Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co.,
122 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 869, 870 n. 11.
19. Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp., 112 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); The Nor-
land, 101 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Cromwell v. Slaney, 65 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933); Ferris v. American S. African Line, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 1296 (S. D. N. Y. 1945);
Dezerene v. U. S., 59 F. Supp. 797 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F.
Supp. 724 (E. D. Pa. 1944) rev'd in part 149 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945); Baker v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Eggleston v. Republic Steel Corp.,
47 F. Supp. 658 (W. D. N. Y. 1942); The New Brooklyn, 37 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1940);
Gardiner v. Agwilines, 29 F. Supp. 348 (E. D. N. Y. 1939); Kwasizur v. Dawnic S. S. Co.,
25 F. Supp. 327 (E. D. Pa. 1938); Christianson v. Western Pac. Packing Co., 24 F. Supp.
437 (D. Wash. 1938); Pottage v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 206 Cal. 622, 275 Pac. 410 (1929).
Decisions under the Federal Employers Liability Act limiting that cause of action to suits
against the carrier-employer are: Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 237 U. S. 84 (1915)
(Pullman porter held not an employee of the railroad); Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry.,
252 U. S. 475 (1920) (Maryland Railroad brakeman held not an employee of Reading Rail.
road although he was under control of latter operating a train on its tracks).
20. 158 P. (2d) 275 (Ore. 1945).
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pany under a General Agency Agreement.2 1 Hust sustained injuries to his
back when he fell through an unguarded and unlighted hatch on the S. S.
Mark Hanna. He proceeded in the Oregon courts against the general agents,
Moore-McCormack Lines, under the Jones Act and recovered a verdict of
$35,000. The Oregon Supreme Court, reversing, reasoned that, under
common law agency doctrine, the seaman was not an employee of the
Moore-McCormack Lines 22 and that he was consequently barred from suing
that corporation under the Jones Act.'
It appeared that the Moore-McCormack Lines did not function beyond
the scope of the General Agency Agreement with the War Shipping Admin-
istration and that it did not exercise or attempt to exercise any control over
the master or crew. 24 Under the service contract,2 , the private company
21. The majority of the cases considering Jones Act suits under the General Agency
Agreement hold the government as the sole employer so that no action will lie against the
general agent. Steele v. American S. African Line, 62 F. Supp. 636 (N. D. Cal. 1945);
Baker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Murray v. American
Export Lines, 53 F. Supp. 861 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Nielsen v. American Prezident Lines,
50 N. Y. S. (2d) 249 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944); Algiere v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 185 Misc.
271, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 361 (Sup. Ct. 1945); see Lewis v. U. S. Nay. Co., 57 F. Supp. 652, 65-1
(S. D. N. Y. 1944); Mclnnis v. U. S., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 1039 (S. D. Cal. 1945); Duvall v.
U. S. Lines Co., 1943 Am. Mar. Cas. 142 (Md. Super. Ct. 1942); Vega v. Alcoa S. S. Co.,
N. Y. Sup. Ct., July 25, 1944. The general agents have been similarly treated as immune
from paying maintenance, cure and wages. Conlon v. Hammond Shipping Co., 55 F. Supp
635 (N. D. Cal. 1944); see Fox v. Alcoa S. S. Co., 143 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944);
cf. Stetson v. American Havaiian S. S. Co., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 1155 (S. D. Cal. 1945).
The War Shipping Administration has taken the position that under this form of agreement
(GAA 4/4/42) the officers and crew of the vessels are the employees of the United States
and not the General Agent. Communication to YALE LAW JouR.mAL from General Counsel,
War Shipping Administration, Oct. 23, 1945. The courts have similarly held the general
agent to be immune from liability for torts to third parties not members of the crew. Peder-
son v. Stockard S. S. Corp.,26S App. Div. 992, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 675 (2d Dep't 1944); Walsh's
Case, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 747 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Pipitone v. Standard Fruit & S. S. Co.,
1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 765 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
22. The opinion considered the possibility of the seaman having two employers, the
War Shipping Administration and the Moore-McCormack Lines, saying, "Where there are
several owners of a vessel, for example, the master may be agent for all. But here, of course,
is no question of dual ownership, and we think the language employed does not admit of
the construction that the master is subject to the control of anyone else than the United
States. And, since the crew 'shall be subject only to the orders of the Master,' their status
as employees of the United States and of no one else, necessarily follows." 153 P. (2d) at
278. From the factual premise adopted, the court's conclusion must seem logically unas-
sailable.
23. As an alternative ground for the decision, the court found that as a matter of sub-
stantive law, the general agent was not liable for the tortious acts of the master or the
boatswain. 15S P. (2d) at 288. See flEsTATEMENT, AGENcY (1933) §§ 79, Comment a,
358(2); 3 C. J. S. 133.
24. 15S P. (2d) 275, 277-8, 282. The rule of the Hust case must be limited to situations
where the general agent does not exceed the terms of the v.ritten agreement and euerc& es
no defacto control over the crew. The Oregon court recognized that "there may, of cource,
be circumstances under which the general agent for the War Shipping Administration would
be liable to a seaman, or to others, as, for example, for injury resulting from negligence in
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was appointed as general agent to manage and conduct the operations of
vessels assigned to it by the United States subject to the directions, orders,
and regulations of the War Shipping Administration. For these and other
services the general agent was paid a monthly stipend plus reimbursement
for authorized expenditures. The master of the ship was procured by the
Lines but was "an agent and employee of the United States" who had and
exercised full control, responsibility and authority with respect to the navi-
gation and management of the vessel. The crew, made available by the
general agents, were hired by the master and were subject only to his orders.
The shipping articles, in fact, designated the War Shipping Administration
as owner of the Mark Hanna and the Moore-McCormack Lines as general
agents and were signed by the plaintiff, Hust, by the master, and by a
deputy United States shipping commissioner. In addition, the crew was
paid by the master with funds provided by the United States in accordance
with the agreement. The conclusion seems warranted that the United
States and not the private shipping company was the employer since the
Government-through its agent, the master-hired, controlled and pos-
sessed the power of discharge over the crew; paid the seaman's wages, and
received the profit from the enterprise.
2 6
failing to equip the vessel properly, or negligence in the selection of the master or a member
of the crew. But that would not be because the seamen are in the employ of the agent, nor
because of any general principle of liability arising from the fact of agency, but it would be
because of the violation of a particular duty toward the injured person which the agent has
assumed." Id. at 287. This liability is often limited to torts of misfeasance and not for torts
of nonfeasance. Pipitone v. Standard Fruit and Steamship Co., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 765
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); see STEFFEN, CASES ON AGENCY (1933) 292-3. In addition to this type
of liability, a general agent may be subjected to Jones Act liability when the doctrine of "un-
disclosed principal" becomes applicable. In Lewis v. U. S. Nay. Co., 57 F. Supp. 652 (S. D.
N. Y. 1944), the general agent held itself out to the crew as the owner of the vessel and at
no time revealed the fact of its agency. Knox, J., stated that ordinarily an injured seaman
would possess no right of action against the general agent, but that because of the failure to
disclose its principal the private company was liable under the Jones Act. This rationale
was criticized in Steele v. American S. African Line, 62 F. Supp. 636, 638 (N. D. Cal. 1945),
on the ground that a statutory cause of action may not be maintained against any party
other than the party statutorily charged with liability, namely, the actual employer. The
required employer-employee status of the Jones Act may be reconciled with the principles
of agency by analogy to the workmen's compensation cases, wherein the remedy is also
dependent upon this employment status. The bulk of the undisclosed principal cases hold
the agent as the actual employer for purposes of paying compensation. Zurich Gen. Ace. &
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Division of Indus. Ace. & Safety, 99 Cal. App. 767, 279 Pac. 473 (1929);
Hicks v. Georgia Cas. Co., 63 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); cf. Cowell v. Indus. Ace.
Comm. of Cal., 11 Cal. (2d) 172, 78 P. (2d) 1016 (1938) (both agent and undisclosed prin-
cipal held as joint employers); see 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1941) 616-7.
Thus a Jones Act recovery against a general agent for the War Shipping Administration
which has held itself out as the ostensible employer appears doctrinally sustainable.
25. The pertinent sections of General Agency Agreement 4/4/42 are set out in the
opinion, 158 P. (2d) at 276-7. Individual citations to article and subsection have been
omitted herefrom.
26. These are the traditional indicia of the master-servant relationship. See 2 MzciM,
LAw OF AGENCY (1914) §§ 1863, 1865; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 220.
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Moreover, the Oregon court seems justified in resolving the employer-
employee status of the injured seaman in terms of the common law?. Even
if the General Agency Agreement is a maritime contract to be construed
according to the law of the sea,23 nevertheless, common law 0 must be dra n
upon since the e.'dsting maritime law is not apposite.P In addition, when a
maritime cause of action is tried in a common law court, the common law
27. 158 P. (2d) at 278. The United States Supreme Court also assumed that "the ordi-
nary rules of Agency" applied in determining the liability of the United States for the torts
of private operating companies. Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 581 (1943);
of. Macomber v. De Bardeleben Coal Co., 200 La. 633, 8 So. (2d) 624 (1942), cert. des ¢ic
317 U. S. 661 (1942).
28. The General Agency Agreement may not be a maritime contract. Contracts be-
tween owners of vessels and general agents or brokers who will supply and maintain ship:
are normally regarded as non-maritime. Minturn v. Maymard, 17 How. 477 (U. S. 1855)
and see cases collected I BEaNmIcT at 138, n. 65. However, a Merchant Fleet operating
contract whereby a private steamship company manned and operated the vesase for the
United States has been held to be a maritime contract. United Fruit Co. v. U. S. Shipping
Bd. Merchant Fleet Corp., 42 F. (2d) 222 (D. Mass. 1930). This type of contract has been
carefully distinguished from the General Agency form of agreement. See 15S P. (2d) at 279;
Murray v. American Export Lines, 53 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The line between
a maritime and non-maritime contract is difficult to draw. See generally, 1 Br;roicr at
123-42; RoBiNsoN at 162-92.
29. The maritime law is not a corpus juris but is a very limited body of customs and
ordinances of the sea. Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205,
220-1 (1917). When the maritime law is inadequate, it is supplemented by the common law.
Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 605 (U. S. 1823) (common law of bailments applied to charter
party); see Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 241-2 (1921) (common law may be
followed when it will not prejudice maritime principles); Palfrey, The Comrion Law Courts
and thw Law of the Sea (1923) 36 HAav. L. REv. 777, 785-6.
30. Although not squarely applicable, the available maritime law would yield the Eame
result. Applying the closest maritime analogy, the charter party relationship, the crew would
appear to be employees of the party who commands the vessel and controls the master, i.e.,
the United States. Whether the charterer or the owner is the employer depends upon
whether there has been, respectively, a demise of the vessel or a contract of affreightment.
Foster v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 131 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Mozer v. Standard
Oil Co. of N. J., 60 F. Supp. 6 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Piniero v. U. S., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 810
(N. D. Cal. 1945); New England Foundation Co. v. Rugo Construction Co., 1945 Am. Mar.
Cas. 513 (D. Mass. 1945); see ROBiNsoN at 611-17. But c. Burlholder v. U. S., 60 F.
Supp. 700 (E. D. Pa. 1945). When there has been no demise of the vessel, crew members
have been considered employees of the owner although hired and partially paid by the
charterer. Stock-ton Sand & Crushed Rock Co. v. Bundensen, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 659
(C. C. A. 9th, 1945). The chief criterion of a demise is a surrender of command and control
of navigation by the owner. 158 P. (2d) at 278-9 and cases cited therein; Davison Chemi-
cal Corp. v. The Henry W. Card, 144 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Pacific Imp. Co. v.
Schubach-Hamilton S. S. Co., 214 Fed. 854 (W. D. Wash. 1914); see The Norland, 101 F.
(2d) 967, 971 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). In the Hust situation control over navigation Tw vected,
by the terms of GAA 4/4/42, in the War Shipping Administration so, by analogy, that body
maybe said to employ the crew. In construing a charter party, however, there is a presump
tion against a demise of the vessel. U. S. v. Shea, 152 U. S. 178 (1894); Reed v. U. S., 11
Wall. 591, 600-1 (U. S. 1870); Federal Forwarding Co. v. Lanasa, 32 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A.
4th, 1929); Ralli Bros. v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 35 F. Supp. 986 (D. Md. 1940). Thus, although
indicative, maritime law does not seem adequate in the instant situation.
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governs issues of remedy and, therefore, whether or not Hust was entitled
to proceed under the Jones Act.3 '
A minority of the courts have held the private shipping company to be
the employer of the seaman under the General Agency Agreement.32 They
consider that Brady v. Roosevelt Shipping Company 33 has established the
maritime tort liability of the general agent. The Brady case was a suit under
the Death on the High Seas Act 34 by the administratrix of a customs inspec-
tor who was fatally injured when a rung broke in a ladder which he was
climbing to board a vessel. The ship was owned by the United States Mari-
time Commission and manned and operated by the private company as
managing agent. The Circuit Court of Appeals considered the operating
company to be a government agency so that the sole remedy of the adminis-
tratrix lay in a libel against the United States.3 5 The Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded, holding that the Suits in Admiralty Act did not de-
prive an aggrieved party of the right to sue the actual tort-feasor. And the
Circuit Court of Appeals was directed to consider whether a cause of action
had been established against the shipping company.
The Brady decision does not appear to support the contention that the
general agent is the employer of the sailor and for this reason the cases rely-
ing upon it do not seem persuasive. First, the opinion was confined to the
specific question of whether, by means of its association with the govern-
31. Although maritime law furnishes the substantive rules of decision, see note 14 supra,
the common law governs issues'of remedy and procedure in a law action. See comments of
Holmes, J., in Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass. 469, 471-2, 37 N. E. 450, 451 (1894), on this
distinction. The cases uniformly support this source of remedial law. See collation in
Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 504. The existence of a cause of action appears to be a "remedial
right" which would be governed by the common law. See HOnFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEoGAL
CONCEPTIONS (1923) 150; see Comment (1945) 55 YALE L. J. 401, 416.
32. McCormick v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 54 F. Supp. 399 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Bast v.
American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 503 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Gay v. Pope &
Talbot Inc., 183 Misc. 162, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 16 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Moss v. Alaska Packers.
Ass'n, 160 P. (2d) 224 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1945); cf. Carroll v. U. S., 133 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943) semble; Schaller v. Matson Nay. Co., 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 566 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943)
(conceded that private company owned the vessel).
33. 317 U. S. 575 (1943).
34. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 761 (1940). The state wrongful death statutes
were sometimes used to create a right of action for seamen's death until 1920 when the Jones
Act and the Death on the High Seas Act superseded this practice. Northern Coal & Dock
Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142 (1928); Matter of Klein, 162 Misc. 589, 295 N. Y. S. 197 (Suer,
Ct. 1937); see Willock, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 255-261. The Brady case could not have
proceeded under the Jones Act since it was not a suit against the employer of the decedent.
Ferris v. American S. African Line, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 1296 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), and cases
cited supra note 19.
35. 128 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), 56 HARV. L. Rrv. 304. The opinion relied
upon U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Lustgarten, 280 U. S. 320 (1930), which
extended the Suits in Admiralty Act to corporations managing or operating vessels owned
by the United States, as well as to corporations, all of whose shares were owned by the
United States. See Hand, J., defending this opinion in Carroll v. U. S., 133 F. (2d) 690,
693 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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ment, the private company achieved immunity from suit.s The issues of
negligence of the managing agent or which party was the employer of the
crew for purposes of vicarious liability were not discussed.- Thus the case
is not authority upon the question of the employer-employee relationship.
Second, the service agreement in the Brady case was significantly different
from the General Agency Agreement. The Roosevelt Shipping Company
contracted to man and operate the vessel so that the control, payment, and
power of discharge of the crew rested upon it; vwhereas the Moore-McCor-
mack Lines in the Hust case merely agreed to equip, victual, supply and
maintain the ship.
It does not seem that adherence in future cases to the rule of the Hiest
decision will be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of seamen.
Under the Suits in Admiralty Act as supplemented by the War Shipping
Administration (Clarification) Act 81 the merchant mariner sailing as a gov-
ernment employee is afforded the same rights, benefits and privileges en-
forceable against the United States as are possessed by seamen on privately-
owned vessels against their employers.40 After his claim for per-onal injuries
36. "The sole question here is whether the suits in Admiralty Act makes private opera-
tors such as respondent non-suable for their torts . . ." 317 U. S. at 577.
37. "We hold that the Suits in Admiralty Act did not deprive petitioner of the right
to sue respondent for damages for his maritime tort. W, hether a caume of action against re-
spondent has been established is, of course, a different question.... The Circuit Court
of Appeals did not reach that question. Accordingly we reverse the judgment and remand
the cause to it." 317 U. S. at 334-5.
33. 317 U. S. 575 at 576, n. 1. In addition the Brady agreement provided that "any
agents selected or appointed by the Managing Agent shall be solely the agents of Eaid Man-
aging Agent and not, in any respect, the agents of the Ovmer." 158 P. (2d) at 286; id. at
279; Murray v. American Export Lines, 53 F. Supp. 861, 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The con-
tention that the General Agency Agreement was purposely phrased to avoid the Brady
decision has been unsuccessfully advanced. Algiere v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 185
Misc. 271, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 361 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
39. 57 STAT. 45 (1943), 30 U. S. C. A. § 1291 (1944). The benefits conferred by this
Act are enumerated in H. R. REP. No. 107, 7Sth Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), which accompanied
the passage of this Act. Both the Act and the report are set out in 1943 Am. Mar. Cas. S94,
606. The coverage of the Suits in Admiralty Act is thereby broadened from'ceaman on
merchant vessels and tugs to all vessels ovmed by or bareboat chartered to the War Shipping
Administration. See Baker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207, 203 (N. D. Cal.
1944).
40. These benefits include War Risk Insurance up to $10,000, Public Health Service
including marine hospitals, old-age and survivors' insurance under the Social Security Act,
plus additional benefits conferred by the Maritime War Emergency Board including War
bonuses and reimbursement for loss of personal effects. See H. R. REp. No. 107, 7Sh Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943) set out in 1943 Am. Mar. Cas. 606, 620. However, to prevent duplication of
benefits, seamen are excluded from the provisions relating to government employees in other
fields. Only for purposes of enforcing their claims under the Suits in Admiralty Act are
merchant seamen on government vessels employees of the United States. United Statu
Navy personnel and other members of the armed forces are excluded from the provisions of
this Act. Bradey v. U. S., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 1329 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
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has been administratively disallowed by the War Shipping Administration,41
the seaman may libel the United States in personam invoking the substan-
tive provisions of the Jones Act,42 or may seek maintenance, cure and wages
or contractual indemnity for failure to provide a seaworthy ship. 4 Reme-
dially, he may be slightly inconvenienced. The statute of limitations under
the Suits in Admiralty Act is two years whereas it is three years for a pro-
ceeding at law under the Jones Act.44 In addition, the suit must proceed in a
federal court sitting in admiralty without a jury.4 However, these disad-
vantages seem too slight to necessitate a change in the conclusions reached
by the Oregon court.
41. By the terms of the Clarification Act, loc. cit. supra note 39, a written claim must
be presented to the War Shipping Administration in accordance with regulations prescribed
in 8 FED. REG. 5414-5 (1943). After 60 days a claim so filed is presumed disallowed. Until
the claim has been disallowed no action will lie against the United States. Fox v. Alcoa S. S.
Co., 143 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944), cert. denied 323 U. S. 788 (1944); Fredricksen v.
U. S., 59 F. Supp. 831 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
42. Dezerene v. U.S., 59 F. Supp. 797 (S. D. N.Y. 1945); Militano v. U. S., 55F. Supp.
904 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Hansen v. U. S., 12 F. (2d) 321 (S. D. Ga. 1926); see Lindgren v.
U. S., 281 U. S. 38 t1930) (by implication); Sevin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 88 F. (2d)
988, 989-90 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Suits brought against the United States under the Jones
Act and dismissed upon grounds other than because that cause of action did not lie against
the government are: Fredricksen v. U. S., 59 F. Supp. 831 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Petersen v.
Skinner, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 511 (W. D. Wash. 1945); Lopez v. U. S., 59 F. Supp. 831
(S. D. N. Y. 1944); Siclana v. U. S., 56 F. Supp. 444 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). Contra: Burkholder
v. U. S., 56 F. Supp. 106 (E. D. Pa. 1944). See generally Willock, op. cit. supra note 16 at
244-5; H. R. REP. No. 107, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Baker v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
57 F. Supp. 207, 208 (N. D. Cal. 1944).
43. Fox v. WSA, 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 345 (E. D. La. 1945); Burns v. U. S., 1945 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1232 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Burkholder v. U. S., 60 F. Supp. 700 (E. D. Pa. 1945).
Abbott v. U. S., 61 F. Supp. 989 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
44. The statute of limitations for Jones Act actions is contained in the Federal Em-
ployer Liability Act, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1940). Engel v. Davenport,
271 U. S. 33 (1926). Originally, two years for law actions, the 1939 Amendment to the
FELA increased the limitation period to three years. Royle v. Standard Fruit & S. S. Co.,
269 App. Div. 762, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 778 (2d Dep't 1945); Streeter v. Great Lakes Transit
Corp., 49 F. Supp. 466 (W. D. N. Y. 1942). But the Suits in Admiralty Act, 47 STAT. 420
(1932), 46 U. S. C. § 745 (1940) (two years), would probably govern the limitation of an
action in the admiralty. See Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 581 (1943); Piastik
v. U. S., 1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 1350 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) semble. But cf. The Swiftarrow, 34 F.
Supp. 541, 547 (E. D. Pa. 1940) rev'd on other grounds, 122 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
45. There is no jury trial for civil suits in the admiralty. Brown v. C. D. Mallory &
Co., 122 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); O'Brien v. U. S. Tank Ship Corp., 16 F. Supp. 478
(S. D. N. Y. 1936); see 2 BENEDICT at 32; 3 id. at 5. This may work a disadvantage to the
sailor if juries tend to favor plaintiffs, as suggested in SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON TORTS (1942) 198. In other respects there is no detriment to seamen in general.
See Murray v. American Export Lines, 53 F. Supp. 861, 864 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). Venue
provisions are slightly more liberal in the admiralty than at common law under the Joneq
Act. Nahmeh v. U. S., 267 U. S. 122 (1925); Galban Lobo & Co. v. U. S., 18 F. (2d) 221
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927); see Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 869. Collection of a judgment against
the United States has been facilitated by appropriating money in advance to meet future
claims. 41 STAT. 527 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 748 (1940). Although he must proceed in the
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The employment status of mariners sailing government-owned merchant
vessels requires judicial clarification. Because of the time required for liti-
gation the short statute of limitations operates, as in the Mst case,4 to bar
recovery against the government if the vrong party is sued initially. As
the war has now ended, the insertion of a clause in the General Agency
Agreement or the shipping articles designating the employer of the crew
appears to be nugatory. It would seem advisable for the United States Su-
preme Court to grant certiorari in one of these cases and settle conclusively
the employer-employee relationship.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN SUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS"
WELL-ESTABLISHED equitable doctrines holding a corporate director to
fiduciary standards of loyalty in dealing with his own corporation I have
taken on increased importance with the widening divergence between on er-
ship and management of corporate assets and consequent enlargement of
the possibility of conflict between personal and corporate interests. In this
development, the constructive trust has proved a useful, remedial device for
divesting a director of profits springing from an unfaithful use of his cor-
porate position, 2 and for holding these profits to the benefit of the wronged
corporation. 3
The recent New York decision of Equity Corporation v. Grot'es 4 implies a
serious restriction on this use of the constructive trust. Defendant director
federal courts, the seaman is compensated by being exempted from filing cost bonds therein.
40 ST-AT. 683 (1918), 28 U. S. C. § 837 (1940); Grant v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet
Corp., 24 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). The foreclosure of the state forum to the mariner
is not too disadvantageous since the same substantive rules of decision are applied whether
the suit proceeds at common law in state or federal tribunals or in the admiralty. Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 317 U. S. 239 (1942); Lindgren v. U. S., 281 U. S. 38 (1930);
Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Dean, 174 Md. 498, 199 AtI. 521 (1938), c-rl. de fed 305 U. S.
628 (1938); see supra note 14.
46. Although Hust is now barred by the two year statute of limitation of the Suits in
Admiralty Act, he is not remediless. He may still file a claim with the War Shipping Ad-
ministration to collect for his injury. A fair administrative tribunal Ehould not difallow a
just claim merely because the sanction of court action has been removed.
* Equity Corporation v. Groves, 294 N. Y. 8, 60 N. E. (2d) 19 (1945).
1. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF COaORAIONS (1931) § 838; see Brincherhoff v.
Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, 58 (1882), dismissed on appeal 106 U. S. 3 (1832) (equity treats di-
rectors as trustees).
2. Flannery v. Flannery Bolt Co., 10SF. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939); see 4 Po'IRnoY,
EQurrY JUnisPRuDENcE (5th ed. 1941) § 1052; 3 FLETcHER at § 861.
3. Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) (profit obtained by
fiduciary, not monetary loss to corporation, measures the damages); cee 3 FLE -cuER at
212; 3 Scovr, TRusTs (1939) 2318; 3 BOGERT, TRusts (1935) § 481.
4. 294 N. Y. 8, 60 N. E. (2d) 19 (1945).
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acquired admittedly unconscionable profits in a complex series of fransac-
tions involving two corporations subsequently merged into the plaintiff,
Equity Corporation. He purchased a large block of stock in one corporation,
Interstate, which he intended to sell to the other, Chain and General. He
then purchased a controlling interest in Chain and General 6 and, after
causing his own election and that of his nominees to the board of directors,
negotiated the sale of his Interstate stock to Chain and General at a large
profit. With this secret profit, defendant purchased other stock and ex-
changed it for shares in the plaintiff corporation, which he then sold at a
further profit.
The Equity Corporation sued for an equitable accounting to acquire all
the profits from both transactions accruing from the admitted breach of
trust. Defendant contended that the corporation's only remedy was an
action for money had and received to recover the original secret profit and
that this action was not within the purview of the ten-year equitable statute
of limitations 6 but barred by the six-year legal statute.7
In upholding defendant's motion to dismiss, the New York Court of Ap-
peals held the Interstate stock to be the corpus of a constructive trust 3 but
reasoned that, since the trust ended when the res was disposed of, the only
wrongful profit was the proceeds of the sale of the stock to Chain and Gen-
eral. The effect of denying defendant's liability for the profit from reinvest-
ment was to bar all recovery under the shorter statute of limitations by
applying the doctrine enunciated in Jno. Dunlop's Sons v. Spurr,9 that since
the profit to the fiduciary director did not exceed the correlated loss to the
corporation, money had and received afforded a sufficient remedy and an
equitable accounting was not required.
However, the court's refusal to allow recovery of the reinvestment profits
does not appear to be justified by the practical difficulties of tracing the
secret profit into the second transaction 10 nor is it sustainable doctrinally in
terms of the Dunlop decision. The latter opinion seems distinguishable
5. This purchase also involved an underwriting transaction financed by an illegal loan
from Interstate to the defendant (N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 59, 114).
6. N. Y. CIvI. PRAcTICE ACT § 53; Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335
(1937). An amendment in 1942, N. Y. CIvIL PRACTICE ACT § 48 (8), has made both legal and
equitable actions of this nature subject to a six-year limitation, thereby rendering moot this
aspect of the Groves decision. However on the measure of damages in a timely action the
holding is important.
7. N. Y. CIvIL PRACTICr ACT § 48; Jno. Dunlop's Sons v. Spurr, 285 N. Y. 333, 34
N. E. (2d) 344 (1941); see Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 653, 698-9 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
alt'd mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 131 (1st Dep't 1941).
8. New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N. Y. 209, 155 N. E. 102 (1926)
(director purchasing property is under a duty to transfer it at cost to corporation).
9. 285 N.Y. 333,34 N. E. (2d) 344 (1941).
10. Since the case was up on its pleadings, the traceability of these profits may be as-
sumed. See dissent, 294 N. Y. 8, 17, 21, 60 N. E. (2d) 19, 23, 26 (1945) (ease of tracing profits
admitted). Difficulty in identifying the reinvestment profit might, in another case, provide
a valid policy basis for a refusal to allow recovery of additional profits.
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since the plaintiff therein sought recovery only of the excess profit realized
from a director's resale of property to his corporation-this single amount
admittedly representing both the total profit to the director and the total
loss to the corporation. 1 Thus, the "correlated loss" theory was merely a
procedural doctrine evolved to determine the applicable remedy with its
corresponding statutory limitation from a given profit and loss.1C Denying
that the lack of reinvestment profits distinguished the Dunlop case, the court
states that, if the additional profits were allowed to be recovered herein the
Dunlop "correlated loss" doctrine would become obsolete, as the possibility
of an increment to the director's profit might exist in every case. It appears
anomalous that a court should demonstrate such solicitude for an abstract
rule of law and decide a case against the weight of precedent and policy 1: to
preserve situations in which that rule might operate.
The gravamen of the majority opinion in the instant case is that the ac-
countability of a fiduciary is limited to the direct product received from the
misuse of trust property.' 4 But, in restricting the constructive trust res
to the property originally purchased, the decision ignores a well-established
line of precedent wherein corporate funds or property improperly obtained
by a director are deemed to be held under a constructive trust 15 for the
11. Jno. Dunlop's Sons v. Dunlop, 259 App. Div. 233, 234, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 313, 319
(1st Dep't 1940), affid sub norm. Jno. Dunlop's Sons v. Spurr, loc. cit. stupra note 9.
12. Cases applying the Dunlop rule have not construed it to be a substantive measure
of damages but only a determinant of the remedy. See Corash v. Texas Co., 264 App. Div.
292, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 (1st Dep't 1942) (royalties sought to be recovered from defendant
identical with those lost by plaintiff); Wagner v. Armsby, 264 App. Div. 379, 35 N. Y. S.
(2d) 488 (1st Dep't 1942) (corporate funds used by directors to settle prior stochholder5'
suit); Savings Bank of New London v. New York Trust Co., 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 963 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (no allegation of profit from defaults of trustee); Goldboss v. Rdmann, 55 F. Supp.
811, 819 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), agffd 143 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) (ci:-year legal statute
applied where profit and loss were "substantially the same"). In addition, in Hastings v.
Byllesby, 265 App. Div. 643, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 299 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd 293 N. Y. 404, 57
N. E. (2d) 733 (1944)--cited by the court in the Grors case as authority for barring recovery
of additional profits--although additional profits were mentioned in the facts, there appears,
from a careful reading, to have been no issue of their recovery in the case.
13. See infra notes 16-7 and text accompanving.
14. To support this proposition the court cites REsTATE.T h-, REsTrrL0.i (1937)
§ 205: "Where a person receives property for which he is accountable to another, he is ac-
countable for any direct product which he receives from the property." The court's infer-
ence that only the direct product is recoverable seems unjustified from this Section and
contradicted by Section 202: "Where a person wrongfully disposes of property of another
knowing that the disposition is wrongful and acquires in exchange other property, the other
is entitled at his option to enforce . . .a constructive trust of the property Eo acquired."
See also 3 BOGERT at § 471; New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 209,
219, 155 N. E. 102, 105 (1926) (a director can "not rid himself of this trust by transferring
the property").
15. See 3 FLETcHER at 208, n. 66 for a collection of cases. Restrictions impo ed on a
corporate director by his fiduciary duties are discussed in Comments (1941) 54 HAnRv. L.
Rv. 1191, (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 219; Notes (1935) 44 YALE L. J. S27, (1936) 3- Mica. L.
RPnv. 1245. See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 588-9 (1873) (fiduciary duty of
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corporation and not only is the original res recoverable but also any incre-
ment.16 When the profits are traceable and identifiable in their final form,
there appears to be no reason for a differentiation between cases where the
increment results from a natural increase in value or from reinvestment.
Indeed the refusal to impose a constructive trust on the funds obtained
from reinvestment in the Groves case favors a director's use of his corporate
position to negotiate a resale once he had acquired the stock.' And under
the view of the majority opinion, a fast-moving director may retain the
fruits of prompt reinvestment, remaining liable only for the original amount
of the secret profit. Even if we assume a case without the unfortunate law-
equity distinction between applicable statutes of limitations which, anom-
alously, still prevails in this code state, such a restriction of the right of
recovery is inconsistent with the traditional application of the constructive
trust device and encourages disloyalty of directors and speculation with
corporate funds.
WILLFUL REFUSAL TO HAVE OR BEAR CHILDREN AS
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT*
THE willful refusal to have or bear children has in no state been made an
express statutory ground for divorce or annulment.' Yet, by employing
varied rationales, a few courts have found such wilful refusal grounds for
director said to be "jealously" viewed by courts); Bain v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285, 288 (1874)
(actual fraud not necessary to force a fiduciary to account).
16. Bachus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. (2d) 357, 363 (D. Minn. 1927) (directors held to ac-
count for profit obtained from stock acquired by misuse of corporate credit despite the fact
they made good the "amount for which the corporate credit was used"); Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A. (2d) 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (where company facilities and funds used by
director to build up successful business venture, entire enterprise goes to corporation);
Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) (proceeds of the investment of
corporate funds illegally borrowed held recoverable by the corporation notwithstanding the
repayment with interest of the loan itself); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 198-9, 189 Atl.
320, 326 (1937) (same); Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo, 319,
325, 66 S. W. (2d) 889, 892 (1933) (return of principal without interest held not to relieve
director's duty to account); In re Franklin Saving & Loan Co., 34 F. Supp. 585, 586 (:. D.
Tenn. 1940) (proceeds of loan obtained by pledge of converted stock held a constructive
trust fund traceable into notes purchased with the fundsand subject to reclamation).
17. Without the resale, the property would remain subject to the constructive trust and
the proceeds could therefore be traced. U. S. v. Dunn, 268 U. S. 121, 132 (1925); In re
Franklin Saving & Loan Co., 34 F. Supp. 661 (E. D. Tenn. 1940); Lightfoot v. Davis, 198
N. Y. 261, 91 N. E. 582 (1910); see RESTATEMENT, RESTTUTION (1937) § 202; 4 BooUT
at 2657.
* Cowen v. Cowen, [1945] 2 All Eng. 197 (C. A.).
1. For a chart of statutory grounds for divorce, see 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNUL-
MENT (1945)" 615-647; for a chart of statutory grounds for annulment, see 1 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) 242-246. For the practical and theoretical differences
between annulment and divorce, see I id. at 237.
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dissolving the marriage bond or holding the marriage a nullity.2 These cases
afford some evidence of an increasing judicial tendency to recognize a legal
right in a spouse to have or bear children, and a correlative duty on the part
of the mate to provide the requisite opportunity.3
In the English case of Cowen v. CowenZ,4 the most recent in this line of
decisions, the facts are undisputed. After marrying in 1932, the parties went
to live in Iran where, due to the lack of modern obstetric and pediatric
facilities, the husband used an artificial appliance to prevent conception.
In May, 1937, the couple returned to England, the wife then requesting her
husband to abandon his precaution against conception in order for her to
bear a child. He refused. Later that year they went again to Iran, and, al-
though the dangers of child-bearing for a European woman had been min-
imized by improved hospital facilities, the husband persisted in his use of
preventatives, even though the wife was still anxious to have children.
During the war, when contraceptives became difficult to obtain in Iran, the
husband resorted to the practice of coitits n terru plus. His continued refusal
to "live a normal married life" with his wife led to disputes betv;een them,
whereupon she left him in 1944 to seek a decree of nullity of their marriage.
In her proceeding the wife based her action on the Matrimonial Causes
Act of 1937. 5 Section 7 (1)(a) of the Act provides that where one of the
parties wilfully refuses to consummate the marriage a decree of nullity may
issue, but the Act nowhere contains a definition of "consummation." Al-
though the trial court held I that a marriage is consummated when there
has been effective penetration, irrespective of whether an appliance is ued
to prevent the procreation of children, the Court of Appeal reveried on this
point, holding that a marriage cannot be said to be consummated "when a
husband deliberately discontinues the act of intercourse before it has reached
2. Cowen v. Cowen, [1945! 2 All Eng. 197 (C. A.); Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N. J.
Misc. 52, 23 A. (2d) 800 (Ch. 1942); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N. W. 252
(1940); Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. 249, 297 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Bernier v,
Veniot, Sup. Ct. of Montreal. July 12, 1945 (Commun;cation to YALE L.-vA JOURNAL from
justice Forrest, author of the opinion, Jan. 22, 1946) (annulment granted where marriage
"has never been consummated on account of the contraceptive usages of the huzband".
Contra: McCurry v. McCurry, 126 Conn. 175, 10 A. (2d) 365 (1939) (evidence held in-
sufficient to prove that wife entered into marriage with concealed intention not to ha,.e
children); Taylor v. Taylor, 142 Pa. Super. 441, 16 A. (2d) 651 (1940).
3. Where this child-bearing opportunity has been provided, but the husband thn
compels his wife to undergo abortion, the wife is held entitled to divorce on ground3 of
cruelty. Dunn v. Dunn, 150 Mich. 476, 114 N. IN% 385 (1907); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 146
App. Div. 430, 131 N. Y. Supp. 291 (2d Dep't 1911). See 1 NLso.:, DivoncE ,%D Am.ut.-
SENT (1945) § 6.26.
4. [1945] 2 All Eng. 197 (C. A.).
5. 1 EDW. 8 & GEo. 6, c. 57 (1937). Prior to passage of this Etatute, if either party
showed that the wilful refusal to consummate the marriage was not the rezult of an incapacity
antedating the marriage but was instead a matter of choice arising after the marriage, no
decree of nullity would issue. Napier v. Napier, [19151 P. 65. See L,%T A" D REEirs, LmW
AND PRACTICE IN DIvoRcE AxND MTATR ONAL CAuSES (1940) 184.
6. Quoted in Cowen v. Cowen, [1945] 2 All Eng. 197,199 (C. A.).
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its natural termination, or when he artificially prevents that natural termina-
tion. . .. "7 In granting the decree of nullity, Lord Justice du Parcq added
that "to hold otherwise would be to affirm that a marriage is consummated
by an act so performed that one of the principal ends, if not the principal
end, of marriage is intentionally frustrated." 8
In the absence of statute, results strikingly similar to the Cowen case have
been reached in several American jurisdictions. Thus, in the case of Kreyling
v. Kreyling,9 a New Jersey court granted a wife a divorce where the husband,
preferring "the luxuries of life like a car every year" to children, persisted in
practicing artificial birth-control, wilfully and contrary to his wife's wishes,
in order to prevent her from becoming a mother. In view of the fact that
both parties were healthy and that the family income warranted children,
the court held that such an unjustified refusal of "natural" relations, wilfully
maintained for the statutory period of two years, constituted desertion. To
decide otherwise, the court stated, would be to establish "legalized fornica-
tion."
Implicit in both the Cowen and Kreyling opinions is the sociological neces-
sity of perpetuating the race. This policy has also been effectuated by the
New York courts in terms of a fraud or deception rationale 10 which would
vitiate any civil contract." For example, in the case of Coppo v. Coppo,12 the
prospective wife informed her would-be groom that she wanted children.
But after the marriage ceremony she refused marital relations except on
condition that her husband take contraceptive measures. The supreme court
held that this change of attitude constituted fraud on the groom and an-
nulled the marriage on his petition.
In the absence of an express representation before the marriage as to the
desire to have children, there might still be some ground for annulment.
Under the New York rule, in order to insure the desired result of procrea-
tion, a promise on the part of each spouse to have or bear children may be
implied in the marriage contract. For failure to fulfill this implied promise,
in derogation of the other party's wishes, a court could, under its general
jurisdiction of actions in contract, decree a nullity of the marriage. Thus the
annulment of a marriage where a spouse is wilfully sterile, 13 regardless of
whether this wilful sterility is fraudulently misrepresented before the mar-
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. Compare Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 80, 150 N. E. 605, 607 (1926)
(leading New York case on the obligation of the parties to a marriage contract).
9. 20 N. J. Misc. 52, 23 A. (2d) 800 (Ch. 1942), 55 HARv. L. lrv. 1044, 26 MINN. L.
REV. 751. See note 2 supra.
10. Fraud is a statutory ground for annulment in 24 states. 1 VERNIrR, AmERICAN
FAnmY LAWS (1931) 241. The relevant New York statute is N. Y. CIv. PRAc'rIc- ACT,
§ 1139. See Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud (1925) 9 MINx. L. REv. 497,
510-13.
11. In New York, marriage has the status of a civil contract. See note 8 supra.
12. 163 Misc. 249, 297 N.Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
13. See Note (1942) 26 MINN. L. REV. 751.
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riage or is entirely concealed, would seem consistent with the physical ster-
ility cases where either fraudulent misrepresentation 14 or concealment 11 as
to sterility are recognized causes for annulment. Certainly, an identical
barrenness results in either case.
Although the cases dissolving the marriage bond for wilful refusal to have
or bear children are still few in number, a pattern for future actions becomes
discernible. A divorce action which, being statutory, is usually strictly con-
strued does not seem the best remedy. Most courts would be unlikely to
expand the concept of "cruelty" or "desertion," as in the Kreyling case, to
cover the instant fact situation." A suit in annulment seems preferable,
since in many states annulment may be had for such grounds as can void a
civil contract."7 Furthermore, courts, if made cognizant of the sociological
objective involved, might be receptive to the idea of granting annulments
where their decision can be rested doctrinally either on fraud or on breach
of an implied promise to have or bear children.
Inasmuch as the marital relation is the only incident of the marriage con-
tract that cannot legally be indulged outside it,13 and such marriage "rela-
tionship shall exist with the result and for the purpose of begetting off-
spring," 39 holding a spouse to a contract of marriage does not seem justifiable
when the offending party either refuses marital relations altogether or else
is wilfully averse to having or bearing children. To refuse relief in these cases
is to deprive the offended spouse of part at least of the bargained-for ex-
change.
This is not to say that every marriage must be dissolved or nullified when-
ever one spouse refuses to have children. Admitting the necessity of main-
taining an ascending birth-rate, it may also be recognized that excessively
large families are not optimum where the health and finances of the parties
do not warrant them.2' Accordingly, the moral problem posed anew by the
Cowen case suggests the desirability of reappraisal-by legislatures, courts
and individual couples-of the problem of birth-control in the light of
modern living.
2'
14. Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 794, 128 P. (2d) 376 (1942); W illiams v. V ril-
liams, 11 N Y. S. (2d) 611 (Sup. Ct. 1939); see 3 NELso., DivoRcEANuDA i A uIt, ENT (1945)
§ 31.38.
15. Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N. IV. 252 (1940); see 3 Noiso:, Ie. cit.
supra note 14.
16. Seenote9 supra.
17. See note 1 supra.
18. 1 Bisnop, MARRUAGE, DrvoRcE,,A.'D SEIPnxTio\x (1891) § 1676.
19. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, SO, 150 N. E. 605, 607 (1926).
20. Even the court in the Kreyling case, 20 N. J. Misc. 52, 23 A.(2d) 800 (Ch. 1942),
cited supra note 9, recognized with implied approval that birth control to space children i
an accepted practice.
21. Note, Judicial Regulation of Birth Control under Obscenity Laws (1941) 50 Yrz
L. J. 682; Note, Some Legislatire Aspects of t7 Birth Control Problem (1932) 45 HMv. L.
REv. 723. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 (1943), dismissing 129 Conn. 84, 26 A. (2d)
582 (1942), the Supreme Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of the Connecticut
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1940 EXTENSION
OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION::
THE recent case of Behlert v. James Foundation of New York was the
fourth consideration by the federal district courts of the constitutional-
ity of the 1940 amendment to the Judicial Code extending their diversity
jurisdiction to include cases involving residents of the District of Columbia,
Hawaii and Alaska.2 The Behlert decision held the amendment unconstitu-
tional, thus tying the score two to two.
3
Until 1933 it was generally believed that Congress could not constitu-
tionally so extend diversity jurisdiction.4 In interpreting the diversity
clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 which conferred jurisdiction over suits
between citizens of different states and which was worded almost identically
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution,6 the Supreme Court treated
statute prohibiting the use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception, and the giving of
counsel in their use (CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6246). The Court dodged the issue by re-
fusing a decision on the merits, and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant, a
physician at whom the statute was directly aimed, had no standing to litigate its constitu-
tionality. Compare State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A. (2d) 856 (1940); Commonwealth
v. Gardner, 300 Mass. 372, 15 N. E. (2d) 222 (1938), dismissed on appeal, 305 U. S. 559
(1938)..
*60 F. Supp. 706 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
2. 54 STAT. 143, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1940). The statute provides that "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: (1) . . . Of all suits of a civil nature, . . .
where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of
$3000, and . . . (b) Is between citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Colum-
bia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any State or Territory." (Emphasis supplied.)
3. In McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Pa. 1942), the court
reached a conclusion similar to that in the Behlert case, but in Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp.
265 (E. D. Va. 1942), and Glaeser v. Acacia Mutual Life Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 925 (N. D. Cal.
1944) the amendment was upheld. The only other judicial consideration of the issue was an
obiter dictum in Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. George-Howard, 55 F. Supp. 921 (W. D. Mo.
1944) to the effect that diversity jurisdiction is not applicable to suits involving residents of
the District of Columbia.
4. The cases are legion. See, e.g., Hepburn and Dundas v. ElIzey, 2 Cranch 445 (U. S.
1805); Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 280 (U. S. 1868); Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395
(1897); In re Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 482 (1905). In Hodgson and Thompson v. Bower-
bank, 5 Cranch 303 (U. S. 1809), the Supreme Court held invalid an Act of Congress which
purported to give federal courts jurisdiction in all suits in which an alien was a party. The
Court ruled that it is necessary to "Turn to the article of the constitution of the United
States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution."
Id. at 304.
5. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
6. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 extends "The judicial power . . . to controversies . . .
between citizens of different States. . . ." This provision only differs from the diversity
clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in that the latter required litigation to be between "a
citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State."
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the constitutional and statutory provisions as coextensive equivalents,7
and held that they did not confer jurisdiction of suits bet%,:een citizens of a
state and of the District of Columbia or the territories.8 Under this view the
constitutional provision was a clause of limitation,9 so that the jurisdiction
of constitutional courts 10 could not be extended beyond its terms.
In 1933, in O'Donoghiue v. United States," there appeared the first crack in
the doctrine that the constitutional courts could receive jurisdiction only
of the cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Section 2. The
Supreme Court therein held that the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, though it possessed a class of jurisdiction outside that
authorized by Article III, Section 2, was in part a constitutional court so
that Article III, Section 1 prohibited the diminution of the salary of its
judges during their term of office. Therefore, the corollary of the limitation
doctrine-namely that a court having jurisdiction of cases not enumerated in
Article III, Section 2 cannot be a constitutional court-was contravened by
the holding of the O'Donoghue case.
The proponents of the amendment admit that Article III, Section 2 does
not authorize the jurisdiction sought to be conferred upon the constitutional
courts, but contend that authority to confer this jurisdiction may be found
elsewhere in the Constitution, namely Article I, Section 3.- They assert
7. Chief Justice Marshall, in Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (U. S.
1805), took judicial cognizance of the similarity between the two, and defined the word
"state" as used in the Act by its meaning within the Constitution. His conclusion was that
the District of Columbia was not a state under Article III, and thus could not be co con-
sidered within the terms of the Act.
S. In New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. S9 (U. S. 1816), the Supreme Court ruled that
diversity jurisdiction as prescribed by the Judiciary Act of 17S9 is not applicable to the
territories. See spra note 4.
9. Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (U. S. 1850); Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S.
1 (1S85); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. ICC, 215 U. S. 216 (1909); Kline v. Burke Construction
Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 (1934).
10. The well-established distinction between constitutional and legislative courts is
based upon the source of Congressional authority to create the court. Those courts which
were established under the authority given to Congress by Article III, § 1, are categorized
as constitutional courts, and all other courts established by Congress as legislative courts.
The most important consequence of the distinction lay in the concept that the powers of a
constitutional court are limited by Article III, § 2, but that legislative courts may be en-
dowed only with powers derived from other sections of the Constitution. American Insur-
ance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1828); Ex psre Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S.
438 (1929); Fed. Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930). See alo 1
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE (1938) 28-32; Note (1934) 34 COL. L. R. 344, 352-4; Katz,
Federal Legislative Courls (1930) 43 HAuv. L. R. 894.
11. 289 U. S. 516 (1933).
12. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8 authorizes Congress to exercise plenary powers in a Dis-
trict "not exceeding ten miles square." H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong., 3d Ses. (1910)
submits that the control over this limited area is a justification for the present amendment.
This view is adopted in Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp. 265 (E. D. Va. 1942), and Glaecer
v. Acacia Mutual Life Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 925 (N. D. Cal. 1944) both cited suvra note 3,
although with evident lack of persuasion. In the Wintbkr case, the court proclaims the
1,046]
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that Article III, Section 2 guarantees to the citizens of states the right to try
diversity cases in federal courts, and does not prohibit Congress from ex-
tending the privilege to others.
13
However, Article III, Section 2 does not guarantee diversity jurisdiction
and does prohibit the extension made by the amendment. There is no
guarantee since Congress may confer or withhold constitutionally-limited
jurisdiction at its discretion, 14 and indeed it was not even obliged to create
the inferior federal courts.15 Furthermore, the assertion that Article III, Sec-
tion 2 does not limit the jurisdiction of the constitutional court is, as has
been stated, contrary to a long line of decisions uncontroverted until the
O'Donoghue case.16 And even in the O'Donoghe decision, nowhere did the
Supreme Court utter any intention to overrule the cases which distinguished
between constitutional and legislative courts and which formulated the
doctrine of limitation. In fact the Court made great efforts to rationalize its
holding in the case without molesting established doctrine, and devoted
most of its opinion to justifying the proposition that the District Court for
the District of Columbia was a court essentially different from the federal
district courts in the states and from the courts in the territories." The
O'Donoghue case would be more accurately cited as declaring that the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia is the only court which may be both
constitutional and legislative-that is, which may be given jurisdiction aris-
ing from Article III, Section 2 and also from other portions of the Constitu-
tion-rather than as a renunciation of the limitation doctrine.
Another argument to sustain the constitutionality of the statutory amend-
ment is that the citizens of the District of Columbia and of the territories
ought not to be deprived of a "right" afforded to citizens of the states.18 The
pity aroused by. this deprivation might be allayed by the realization that it
doctrine with the half-hearted statement that "it is not at all apparent that Congress ex-
ceeded its powers under the Constitution . . ." 43 F. Supp. at 268.
13. H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940) 3; Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp.
265, 268 (E. D. Va. 1942).
14. The courts are unanimous that diversity jurisdiction is not a right but a privilege
resting solely upon the will of Congress. Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236 (U. S. 1845), Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441 (U. S. 1850); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Lauf
v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); Lockerty v. Phillips, 49 F. Supp. 513 (D. N. J.
1943), aff'd 319 U. S. 182 (1943).
15. U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (U. S. 1812); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 I-low.
441,449 (U. S. 1850); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922).
16. See note 4 supra.
17. 289 U. S. 516, 534 et seg.
18. See H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 3: "It should be borne in
mind that the citizens of the District of Columbia and of the Territories are citizens of the
United States. They are subject to the burdens and obligations of such citizenship just as
the citizens of the 48 States. Simple justice requires that they should share the rights and
privileges of such citizenship insofar as Congress has authority to confer it upon them.
This is the real intent of the Constitution." See also Comments (1940) 29 GEo. L. J. 193,
(1946) 46 COL. L. R. 125.
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carries with it a corresponding immunity from suit in the federal courts.
Furthermore, the residents of the District and the territories suffer no sub-
stantial disadvantage by being precluded from diversity jurisdiction as
they have access to the courts of the District and of the several states.
Since the federal courts are now compelled to apply the substantive law of
the states in which they sit," the applicable rules of decision are the same
regardless of the forum. Moreover, they are not deprived of a remedy in the
federal tribunal when a general federal question is in controversy.c2
To date the 1940 amendment has been considered only by district courts.
The incumbent Supreme Court may well resolve this divergence among the
lower judiciary by declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional for the
first time since 1936.21
INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS OF TRAVELING EXPENSES
"WHILE AWAY FROM HOME"*
IN computing taxable income under the Federal Internal Revenue Code, a
taxpayer is authorized by Section 23 (a)(1) to deduct "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business including . . . traveling expenses (including the entire
amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the
pursuit of a trade or business." I Originally enacted in 1921,2 this provision
was intended to apply to living expenses incurred by traveling salesmen3
and others similarly situated because of prolonged absence from an estab-
19. Erie R. R. v. Tomplins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. 54 STAT. 143, 28 U.S. C. § 41 (1) (1940).
21. Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U. S. 513 (1936) [Act of May 24, 1934,
4S STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. §§ 301-3 (1934) amending Bankruptcy Act, held unconstitutional].
But cf. Tot v. U. S., 319 U. S. 463 (1943) (minor statutory provision).
* Commissioner v. Flowers, 66 Sup. Ct. 250 (U. S. 1946).
1. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (a)(1) (1939). "Allowable deductions from groz3 income in
determining taxable net income are controlled by specific provisions in the tax statute."
4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcO,ME TAxATiON (1942) 303. Compare TiT. RLv. CoDE
§ 24(a)(1) (1939).
2. Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a) 1. This clause vas reiinacted in the came form in
every subsequent Revenue Act.
3. "... [P]rovision is made for the deduction of traveling expensts of pereons travel-
ing on business. This will affect the commercial travelers of the country, and especially tho:e
who are traveling on a commission basis." 61 CoNG. REc. 5201 (1921). "... [IW]hen the
language . . . was considered by the committee it was discussed from the standpoint of
allowing the exemption to traveling salesmen. It ,as thought that their traveling expenz'2
were a matter for proper deduction and that their meals and lodging should be included in
such deductions." Id. at 6673.
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lished residence.4 But the broad statutory language was seized upon by tax-
payers seeking to justify deductions apparently far beyond the limited pur-
view of the statute. Thus, the problem confronting the tax courts has been
to afford traveling salesmen their authorized deductions and, at the same
time, to prevent "free rides" by commuters and others.5 The resulting
litigation centered upon the interpretation of the word "home" 6 as mean-
ing: (1) residence7 (2) place of business, and (3) an area embracing both
residence and business establishment." In practical application, however,
consistent adherence to any one of the above definitions of "home" .could not
produce the coverage desired for the Section.
Adopting "home" as meaning place of residence the Commissioner and the
tax courts uniformly allowed deductions to traveling salesmen with no fixed
business office when the taxpayer was away from his residence.' But such a
definition would permit commuters who lived and worked in different
communities to obtain tax deductions for expenses incurred while absent
from domicile.
To obviate commuter's exemptions, the tax courts interpreted "home" as
4. "Since all business expenses are deductible, this provision with regard to traveling
expenses has the effect chiefly of avoiding any argument with respect to their classification
as business expenses. GEORGE T. ALTMAN, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL TAXATION (1938
Act) (2d ed. 1938) 60.
The taxpayer's fixed overhead continues while he is absent from his residence. Expenses
for food will also be increased because of the unavailability of household services and the
economies that are effected through family co6peration. Therefore, the increased expenses,
when caused by business necessity, can be logically classified as business expenses. "Simply
because the amounts in question happen to be living expenses in a strict sense does not pre-
vent them from being deductible if . . clearly in addition to his living expenses at the
usual place of abode. . . ." Chester D. Griesemer, 10 BTA 386, 389 (1928), approved.
Walter F. Brown, 13 BTA 832 (1928). Cf. Howard Murphy, 1 CCH 1943 Fed. Tax Serv.
Dec. 13056 (M) (TC mem.).
5. The statute envisions deductions for additional living or personal expenses caused
by travel necessary to the business, as opposed to ordinary living or personal expenses. "In
computing net income, no deductions shall in any case be allowed in respect of .. .per-
sonal, living, or family expenses." INT. REv. CODE § 24(a)(1) (1939).
6. See 2 Prentice-Hall 1946 Fed. Tax Serv. 11271; 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INc mE TA ATION (1942) § 25.82.
7. Throughout this Note, residence will be used in the sense of a dwelling place which
the taxpayer regards as permanent, and which is the center of his domestic and social life.
It has the economic connotations referred to in note 4 supra. The word "home" is the best
descriptive word available, but for obvious reasons cannot be used here.
8. Although never expressly defined in this manner in the opinions, this definition
seems to be implicit in the approach to the problem and in the results obtained.
9. Charles C. Gustafson, 3 TC 998 (1944); J. H. Armstrong, 6 BTA 384 (1927); Wil-
liam M. Escavaille, 3 BTA 51 (1925). In cases involving sufficiency of proof of specific
items in expense accounts, the Commissioner and the courts seem generally to have assumed
that living expenses incurred by a traveling salesman while away from his residence on
business were deductible. M. Lucas, 13 BTA 642 (1928); A. L. Weiner, 10 BTA 1184 (1928);
Leon Oppenheimer, 7 BTA 1156 (1927); David Sonenblick, 4 BTA 986 (1926); Samuel
Cooper, 1 BTA 615 (1925).
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"place of business." 10 This definition also denied deductions to business men
living beyond commuting range who maintained temporary lodgings in the
vicinity of their offices.' However, under this theory, expenses for business
trips to areas near the taxpayer's residence would be deductible even though
the taxpayer actually stayed at his own house.12 Moreover, to cover travel-
ing salesmen the courts would be required to indulge in the fiction that the
salesman's residence was his principal place of business. 13 Finally, under this
definition, a taxpayer with more than one principal place of business would
theoretically receive no deduction for trips between them while in practice
the tax courts have uniformly allowed him to subtract expenses incurred
while traveling to the business situated farthest from his residence. 4 Simi-
10. John S. Martin, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 944198 (TC mem.); John M.
and Virginia Dickey, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 944104 (TC mem.); Walter M.
Priddy, 43 BTA IS (1940). Some courts have based their decisions on the ground that the
expenses were not business expenses. Abraham W. Ast, 9 BTA 694 (1927); Franklin .
Magil, 4 BTA 272 (1926); Sarah Backer et al., Executors, 1 BTA 214 (1924); Frank H.
Sullivan, 1 BTA 93 (1924); but cf. Joe MIay, 39 BTA 946 (1939) (deductions allowed where
taxpayer conducted a part of his business at his residence). This same theory was held to
justify deductions for food and lodging when business interests caued the taxpaycer's
absence from his principal business office at irregular interals and for comparatively Ehort
periods. Ray Harroun, Prentice-Hall 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. 945252 (TC mem.); Charles
Hutchison, 13 BTA 1187 (1928); J. C. Palmer, 1 BTA 882 (1925). The longer the taxpayer
works at one place, the greater the probability that the tax courts will hold that this place is
the taxpayer's "home." Compare Harry F. Schurrer, 3 TC 544 (1944), vith MIort L. Bixrcr,
5 BTA 1181 (1927); compare also Ernest T. Laubscher, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Sa-v.
41315 (TC mem.), and Al-in A. Hathaway, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 44369
(TC mem.), with Clarence W. Todd, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Surv. 3 44374 (TC mere.).
See U. S. Treas. Regs.: 111, 101, 94 and 86, Art. 23(a) 2; 77 and 74, Art. 122; 69 and 65,
Art. 102; and 62, Art. 101(a).
11. Nirlliami L. Tracy, 39 BTA 578 (1939); George W. Lindsay, 34 BTA 840 (1936);
Jennie A. Peters, 19 BTA 901 (1930); Walter Schmidt, 11 BTA 1199 (1923); cf. Ernest T.
Laubscher, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. 44315 (TC mem.); Mort L. Bisler, 5 BTA
1181 (1927). Contra: Elmore L. Potter, 18 BTA 549 (1929).
12. Such a result would be squarely opposed to Ihr. Rnv. CODE § 24(a)(1). See note 5
supra.
13. The economic fact which entitles the taxpayer to the deductions is his ab:zce from
a fixed place of abode where normal living expenses are incurred and which continue decpite
his temporary absence. The migratory nature of the business makes it impractical to changa
residence continually, and thereby compels the taxpayer to incur additional livng e.xpnses.
In two cases, where the taxpayer maintained no fixed residence, an artificial result was
obtained by employing the fiction that the taxpayer's "home" was his employer's budinecs
headquarters. Howard Murphy, 1 CCH 1943 Fed. Tax. Serv. Dec. 130560(M) (TC mem.)
(deductions allowed for the difference between actual expenditures and estimated expzndi-
tures if taxpayer had maintained a residence); Simeon J. Smith, 2 CCH 1943 Fed. Ta.xc
Serv. Dec. 13522(M) (TC mem.) (all expenses incurred while away from city where em-
ployer maintained headquarters deductible). Contra: Charles E. Duncan, 17 BTA 103
(1929) aff'd -without opinion, 47 F. (2d) 1082 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (deductions dizallowed on
the ground that "home" meant taxpayer's place of business).
14. Joseph W. Powell, 34 BTA 655 (1936); Walter F. Brown, 13 BTA 832 (1923).
This result seems desirable since the taxpayer cannot be expected to maintain more than one
residence. Cf. Estate of Robert S. Shelley, Prentice-Hall 1945 Fed. Tax Sr. 9 45220,
1946I
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larly, a journeyman plumber whose office was traditionally in his tool-bag
and who regularly pursued his trade within commuting radius of his resi-
dence was allowed deductions when intermittent contracts took him to jobs
away from that area 15 -a result incompatible with "home" as "place of
business."
To allow these multiple-place-of-business deductions, a third possible
definition of "home" might be the area including both residence and prin-
cipal place of business. While eliminating deductions for commuting ex-
penses, this concept seems unsatisfactory because of the practical difficulties
of fixing the boundaries of the area.16 Also, it is not a definition in fact or
one according to the terms of the statute but merely a question-begging
device to accomplish the purpose of the statute. Thus it seems that a mean-
ingful application of this Section cannot be phrased in terms of the word
"home."
When cases under Section 23 (a) (1) reached the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, the inadequacy of criteria based solely upon the definition of "home"
was realized. But these courts split on how else to protect only those whose
actual living expenses were increased by the demands of their business.
The Second and Ninth Circuits held that living expenses of actors who were
performing contracts in Hollywood were deductible as necessary business
expenses; 17 while the Fourth Circuit refused deductions to state supreme
CCH 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. Dec. 14642(M) (TC mem.); Charles J. McLennan, Prentice-Hall
1945 Fed. Tax Serv. 45217 (TC mem.); Mortimer M. Mahony, Prentice-Hall 1945 Fed.
Tax Serv. 45122, CCH 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. Dec. 14508(M) (TC mem.); Emil B. Meyro-
witz, 3 BTA 1327 (1925); but cf. Ernest T. Laubscher, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv.
44315 (TC mem.).
15. Harry F. Schurrer, 3 TC 544 (1944). "The Congress undoubtedly intended that the
taxpayer's personal expenditures in maintaining his usual place of abode should not be
deducted, but that all expenditures made by the taxpayer in addition to those amounts if
incurred in carrying on a trade or business should be deducted in determining net income."
Chester D. Griesemer, 10 BTA 386, 389 (1928); approved, Walter F. Brown, 13 BTA 832
(1928).
"It would require a strained construction of the statute to hold that he established a
home each time he moved from one race track to another." Estate of Robert S. Shelley,
Prentice-Hall 1945 Fed. Tax Serv. 45220 (TC mem.) at 45-738.
16. Quaere whether a taxpayer who lived beyond commuting range or who was occa-
sionally required by his business to spend nights "in town" could, under this definition,
obtain deductions if he stayed in a nearby suburb.
17. In Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F. (2d) 763, 764 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), the court
said, "But granting this and assuming that the words of the statute may be given a special
'tax sense,' we are convinced that a taxpayer's home, even in such sense ought to be limited
to the place where he is regularly employed or customarily carries on business during the
taxable year." And in Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F. (2d) 407, 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944),
the court said, "A home in relation to the place of abode is a dwelling place of a person, dis-
tinguished from other dwelling places of that person by the intimacy of the relation between
the person and the place. We have found nothing ...which denotes any intention by
Congress to attribute to the word 'home' as therein used any unusual or novel meaning."
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court justices for expenses occasioned by travel to and boarding at the state
capitol during court sessions. 8
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Flowers 'z considered Section 23
(a) (1) for the first time and established therein a workable formula to guide
future decisions. Flowers, the taxpayer, had been employed as counsel for
the predecessor of the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad, ith principal
offices in Jackson, Mississippi, and had maintained his residence in that city
all his life. When the G. M. & 0. was formed, the corporate offices were
shifted to Mobile, Alabnma; but he continued to live in Jackson although
business required his presence in Mobile. The Board of Tax Appeals denied
Flowers' claimed deductions for living expenses in Mobile, saying that such
expenses were personal, and not necessary to the conduct of the businezs. -
This decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 2 ' on the
ground that "home" meant place of residence and the expenditures were
consequently deductible.2 The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals I and stated that traveling expenses to be deductible
must be: (1) reasonable and necessary; (2) occasioned by business necessity;
and (3) incurred while away from home.24 The Court, however, found it
unnecessary to construe the phrase "incurred while away from home" by
holding that the instant expenditures were the result of the taxpayer's
desire to live in Jackson and in no way necessary to the business.
At first appraisal, the criteria announced seem merely to postpone con-
sideration of the phrase "away from home" until the requirement of busi-
ness necessity is satisfied. But as the correlation of the expenditure Vith the
demands of business is now made the critical factor in each situation, "home"
need no longer be construed in any but its popular sense. Thus, traveling
salesmen and journeymen laborers will be allowed deductions because the
migratory character of their business requires their absence from a fixed
18. Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945). The court based its
argument on analogy to commuters' expenses. "The statute implies that home and place of
business must be in the same general locality. We think that the statute must ba given this
construction and that it may be done without arbitrarily construing the word "home" as
synonymous with the term "place of business." Id. at 917.
19. 66 Sup. Ct. 250 (U. S. 1946).
20. J. N. Flowers, Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax Serv. j 44263 (TC mene.).
21. Flowers v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
22. "We find no basis for this interpretation. There is no indication in the statute of a
legislative intention to give the word an unusual or extraordinary meaning." Id. at 164.
23. 66 Sup. Ct. 250 (U. S. 1946). Justice Rutledge dissented on the ground that the
majority opinion rested on the unstated premise that "home" means place of businezs.
His argument was that the majority had rephrased the language of the statute. Id. at 254.
The argument is sound on a verbal level, but ignores the purpose for which the "traveling
expenses" clause was inserted in Nr. REv. CODE § 23(a)(1). The majority interpretation
has the effect of adding to the clause "traveling expenses incurred while away from home,"
the words "on travel which is necessary to the interests of the busine s."
24. Id. at 252.
25. Id. at 253.
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residence. A taxpayer with more than one place of business will be allowed
deductions when required to visit the business farthest from his residence.
However, a commuter or a taxpayer who maintains his domicle beyond
commuting range of his regular place of business will not be allowed the
deductions, because their living expenditures are incurred through personal
choice of residence and not required by business necessity.
In de-emphasizing "home" and stressing the purpose of the statute, the
Court has eliminated the necessity for verbal hair-splitting in determining
the propriety of deductions.
